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Losing Georgia

Russia’s invasion of Georgia on Friday has been illustrative in a number of ways:

First, it’s now clear that Putin’s Russia is undeniably set upon a course of regaining at least de facto control over its former satellites, some of which have been resisting Russian and Soviet expansion for centuries.

Second, NATO’s almost complete irrelevance has been laid bare. If the member states’ reluctance to contribute combat troops in Afghanistan weren’t enough, NATO’s dithering on admitting Georgia because of Russian security concerns means that Russia basically has unofficial veto power over NATO decisions.

Third, and related to the above point, Europe’s commitment to resisting Russian expansionism can probably no longer be counted on in any serious way, given that the economies of Europe are heavily dependent on Russian oil and natural gas exports. Standing up against Russian aggression, especially if Russia establishes control over Georgian pipelines, would be economically hazardous for the rest of Europe. It’s likely that the most we can expect is a few sternly-worded expressions of “concern” and efforts to “resolve” any conflicts involving Russia, which the Russians would be more-or-less free to ignore unless they were generally favorable to their interests.

Finally, the essentially anti-American and anti-Israeli character of the so-called “anti-imperialist” crowd has been confirmed. There have been few expressions of “solidarity” with Georgia and none of the lionization we’ve seen heaped upon “the resistance” in Iraq and elsewhere (remember “We are all Hizb’Allah now!“?).

It’s not as if all the usual ingredients are missing: oil, lack of international approval, a naked land grab and basically unprovoked invasion, civilian casualties, a “disproportionate response” — essentially all the complaints that were trotted out in 2003 (and 1991, frankly).

No, there will be no protests, no street theatre, no demands that heads of state be marched around the Hague. Much like what happened during the period Serbian adventurism in the 1990’s, we can probably expect a lot of dithering, a lot of excuses, and probably a few outright defenses of the aggressors from the “anti-imperialist” bunch.

Socialist Worker’s Party hack Richard Seymour (aka “Lenin”, known for his support of Serbian expansionism), for instance, has already blamed the United States for instigating and prolonging the conflict:

Georgia and its backers are being absolutely intransigent, refusing to withdraw Georgian troops from South Ossetia, where – not that you would know it from much of the reporting – they are actually carrying out serious atrocities.

Harry’s Place notes that “Socialist Unity” endorses this point of view as well:

So the signs are that current war has been manufactured in Washington, and executed by Georgia.

The responsibility for preventing the war escalating lies with Washington, who must use their influence to reign back the Georgian government, and stop destabilising the present status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both of whom wish the Russians to stay.

These goblins, of course, completely ignore the fact that Russia’s “peace overture” would simply have the effect of finalizing Russia’s conquest of South Ossetia by forcing the Georgians to lay down their weapons now that the Russians have taken control on the territory. The Russians, for their part, rejected a return to the status quo ante and demanded that the democratically elected President of Georgia be removed. Hardly the “peacekeepers” resisting Georgian/American aggression that the “anti-imperialist” crowd is making them out to be.

Even Andrew Sullivan, who, despite his visceral disgust with the Bush Administration, is nowhere near as slimy and disingenuous as bloggers such as Seymour,  can’t help but draw some sort of moral equivalence between Russia’s invasion of Georgia and the US invasion of Iraq:

On what grounds, after all, does the Bush administration condemn Russia? Launching a war without UN permission? Er … it’s not that easy for the US to go all high-minded at this point. How strong is the NATO alliance in reacting to this kind of provocation? Immeasurably weakened by the past seven years. Why is Russia so much more powerful than it was? Putin’s political skills and oil – whose value has sky-rocketed since the US invasion of the Middle East.

So can we quit the hyper-ventilating, please? This is another indicator of how the world is not uni-polar, and how badly this administration has managed American soft and hard power for the last seven years. A stronger, more belligerent Russia is part of the post-Bush picture. And there’s not much anyone can do about it now. [emphasis added]

It seems bizarre to me that Sullivan would compare Russia’s naked land grab in Georgia with the invasion of Iraq. Yes, there are superficial similarities (no U.N approval, etc.), but even the most stringent opponent of Bush and the Iraq war cannot help but admit to the months of debate in the Security Council, the numerous resolutions, or the fact that American aircraft had been in a low-intensity shooting war with Iraqi air defense forces for nigh on a decade in a country where the U.S. has no territorial ambitions. The same cannot be said of Russia with regard to Georgia, and Andrew Sullivan makes a fool of himself by drawing the comparison.

He also misses the mark when he insinuates that a resurgent Russia is necessarily the product of Bush’s foreign policy. Russia’s aforementioned oil resources and European military apathy, as demonstrated in Afghanistan, have, I think, much more to do with Russia’s boldness than do any of Bush’s numerous foreign policy blunders.

In the end, the West’s failure in Georgia is symptomatic of a larger disease, one that views any sort of military action as unwarranted, unjust, and unnecessary. Robert Bidinotto has labeled this mindset as “anticipatory capitulation“:

The greatest terror of postmodern Westerners is “confrontation”: to be compelled into situations in which they must actually face down a bully. And, of course, taking a moral stand may sometimes lead to such “confrontations.”

So, in anticipation of any course of action that could possibly lead to a “confrontation,” postmoderns never take a moral stand. They look into the future, at where such a stand might lead them — and, terrified by the prospect, they back down pre-emptively. Often, they seek some sort of “compromise” with thugs that takes the “confrontation” option off the table. “Compromise” here means: anticipatory capitulation.

This is the policy that Border’s Books, Comedy Central, and the entire MSM adopted when contemplating even a hypothetical “confrontation” with Islamists who might become angry about their circulation of those Muhammad cartoons: They capitulated and refused to publish the cartoons, in mere anticipation of a possible showdown. [I’d add the recent Random House controversy…]

This is the policy that has, in fact, lay beneath much of Western foreign policy — as in endless, toothless UN resolutions (when they can even agree on one), and in our State Department’s anemic practice of tepidly voicing “concern” about this or that international bully’s actions, while evading any “provocative” language of condemnation that might “escalate” to a direct confrontation.

This all leads us to the question of whether our allies (Taiwan, anyone?) will, in the future, trust us to stand by them or simply expect us to issue a few strongly-worded statements and otherwise stand by while authoritarian states prey on their weaker neighbors.

Based on what’s happened so far in Georgia, I think the answer is fairly clear.

[EDIT]

Meanwhile, Michael Totten, who’s on his way to Azerbaijan, links to this May dispatch from Georgia. From the sound of things, South Ossetians really want to be part of Russia — or at least independent from Georgia. I’m not sure I’m entirely comfortable with Georgia militarily trying to prevent that — shades of Serbia, and all — but I’m pretty sure that Russia getting involved military isn’t the right way for that particular question to be resolved. It’s almost certainly not the best way to deal with the South Ossetia question, and it’s all a little too convenient for Russia. Some have gone so far as to call South Ossetia Russia’s “Sudetenland” or a latter-day Finland. I’m not sure if I think that’s totally apt, but there are shades of all that in what we’re seeing today.

  1. Vincent says:

    Ian: As the person who posted that video noted, it’s forgivable that he might initially have mistaken what the questioner was asking about, but to go on to admit he hadn’t even heard of the invasion is a bit pathetic.

  2. Chris Holman says:

    Interesting story on polls in the Ukraine showing the population voting against NATO membership.

    http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/06/16/europe/nato.php

  3. Chris Holman says:

    Cool, thanks!

  4. Vincent says:

    Chris:

    I don’t know why your comments are ending up getting caught by the spam filter, to be honest. It only seems to be happening to you, though.

    I’ll try to figure out what’s going on.

  5. Chris Holman says:

    For some reason, late night postings to this aren’t working…is there a timeout feature for comments or something? It’s happened two nights in a row, but maybe it’s a weird glitch on my end. Anyway…

    My problem with “center of jihadism” is that when I read it, I think of something like the Mormon Missionary Training Center where every Mormon goes to at some point to be trained in a language and in prosletyzing technique. Then, they’re sent out to the world to do god’s work. I think there are jihadist elements in the places you’ve listed, but…well….

    For instance, there were no real jihadist elements in Iraq pre-US invasion. There has never been a true Al-Qaeda presence in Iraq (you can’t count AQ in Iraq because they are wannabe’s led by now-dead Zarqawi who pledged allegiance to Bin Laden only in 2004). Calling it a center of jihadism makes no sense whatsoever unless you are speaking to the way that many foreign fighters have come to Iraq since then to take their chances at killing Americans.

    In Iran…well, Hezbollah is becoming more legit in Lebanon, but even with Iranian support I don’t know if you can call Iran a center of Jihadism. That also insinuates that Iranians are largely militant Muslims. It’s not true.

    Afghanistan, well, many view the fight there in holy terms since the ousting of the USSR, but I would argue that affiliation there is stronger when it comes to tribe than it is with flavor of Islamic belief.

    In Chechnya and other FSU states where Islam has a small hold, it’s a completely different type of Islam for the majority. There are elements that are Wahhabi-esque in nature, but even then the fighting can’t be boiled down to Jihad. I will give you that the notion of Jihad as self-defense is often used to bolster a movement’s rationale for taking action, but the cause of ‘resistance’ is rarely to go out and purify the world. There are some groups who do that, but they’re small in number.

    Turkey has been chasing Kurds, but even those Kurds they’re chasing are terrorists according to the US. Does that not fit into the wider fight in the War on Terrah?

    Interesting post Jim, thanks. I still think the Russians came out on top in this, but just barely. Even still, the US reaction is post-Sarkozy and is likely not what was expected in the first place.

  6. Chris Holman says:

    I’m saying that while it might me people who label themselves as holy warriors doing the fighting in some of those places, the issues are not always as easily reduced to Islam and Jihadism. Iran’s support for Hezbollah is one thing, but stretching that to “Iran” is….problematic to me. Even in Afghanistan you only have certain groups of ‘jihadis’ that are more aligned tribally than by flavor of Islam.

    Iraq, for instance, was not a center of any kind for Al-Qaeda activity…unless you’re saying post-US invasion. Even then, Al-Qaeda wannabes were the only people we really heard from (i.e. Zarqawi).
    http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0406/p99s01-duts.html
    http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/03/13/alqaeda.saddam/index.html

    If Suskind’s letter (via his new book) holds up under scrutiny, I imagine it might finally lead to the right questions being asked in relation to the Al-Qaeda in Iraq myth (not Zarqawi’s group of that name which only declared allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2004…a convenient name change for a wannabe).

    I just have a problem with “center of jihadism” as acceptable terminology to describe anything accurately. It implies something that isn’t really true…as I read it anyway. Jihadis are in those places, but they’re also in many other places that are also not centers of Jihadism.

    As for the cease-fire violations, I think it’s just a bunch of hollow finger pointing on either side as things slowly grind to a halt. The Russians are saying they were guarding weapons depots, but who knows. They’re heading home now. I think that on the whole, the Russians gained, but just barely.

  7. This interesting post from Rich Lowry on National Review (kind of a contra position to all the “Russia is getting just what they want” positions):

    “I just talked to a friend who is very plugged into this and is as shrewd and informed an observer on the European scene as you can find. He thinks it’s going badly for the Russians and is not 1968 redux as they had hoped. The presidents of the Baltic states and Poland have flown to Tbilisi, providing a moral backstop for the Georgian government. And now the Bush administration is stepping up, with Bush’s stern words today, with humanitarian aid going to Georgia that the Russians can’t possibly oppose, and with Sec. Rice headed to Tbilisi. All this is serving to frustrate the ultimate Russian war aim of toppling Saakashvili, who is addressing enthusiastic crowds on the streets and taking the Russians to the Hague. He thinks the fact that it hasn’t turned out the way the Russians expected accounts for the constant back-and-forth about whether they are stopping or not.”

  8. Vincent says:

    You think Chechnya, Iran and Iraq are centers of Jihadism?

    Err, yes. Al three (and throw in Afghanistan, too) are places where jihadis are or have been fighting in large numbers or receiving training and support from, and I hardly think that it’s alarmist to be concerned about these elements destabilizing their neighbors (Chechens moving into Pankisi Gorge, anyone?).

    Your points re: Turkey are well taken. Do note that I called the Turkish government “nominally Islamist”. Turkey is secular and it’s not run by ayatollahs, but the question of Turkey’s future and which way it will go seems very much up in the air at this point, especially if EU membership isn’t forthcoming. As for their reliability versus Georgia’s, the only Turkish troops that’ve been in Iraq since 2003 were chasing Kurds, as far as I know. On the other had, we just finished airlifting a bunch of Georgian troops home from Iraq.

    My definition of jihadism is, I think, a pretty standard one. The Iranians might not be directly engaging in jihad activities, but they’re one of the biggest backers of Hizb’Allah. Chechnya was, along with the Afghan War against the Soviets, a major training ground for al Qaeda terrorists, and Iraq, until fairly recently, was an epicenter of al Qaeda activity.

    How any of that somehow doesn’t qualify as being a center of jihadism, I’m not entirely sure.

  9. Chris Holman says:

    You think Chechnya, Iran and Iraq are centers of Jihadism? That’s just reducing very complicated situations to the jingle of the decade, don’t you think?

    Turkey is only really causing problems with the PKK who I would argue put Iraqi Kurds into a hard place. It’s not like all Kurds are allied with one another; it took a long time and a lot of death and maneuvering for Iraqi Kurds to coalesce to the point they’re at now. Your point about the Islamist government is moot as well given the way the Turkish government is secular and that this is enforced militarily (relatively often). Turkey is arguably Israel’s strongest ally in the region, the US has multiple military bases in Turkey and…well, I think that Georgia pales in comparison really.

    Ok, screw Saakashvili.

    I’m curious as to what you mean by jihadism too.

  10. Vincent says:

    You

  11. Chris Holman says:

    Yeah, “proxy” is a stretch, but how much of a stretch? : ) Georgia is just standing out like the poster child of US sponsorship in that region is all.

    “centers of jihadism” You’ll have to explain that one to me.

    How is Turkey unreliable in comparison to Georgia? We can count on Georgia to be in lockstep with US policy? Why is that, if that is the case?

    I’ll give you Georgian democracy, but even ol’ Saak has been devolving in that regard.

    Georgia makes strategic sense in the War on Terror? Please explain that to me too. I’d say that it makes strategic sense in the fight against the smuggling of nuclear materials out of Russia and into…the world. South Ossetia has been a haven for such things as of late.

    Interesting move by Russia, if it’s true. I imagine this will get fleshed out some more.

  12. Vincent says:

    Ok. My figure was for military aid alone, not other projects (such as hydroelectric production, etc. which is mentioned at your link). It’s important to note, however, that $100 million/year for 8 years still isn’t all that much. According to this State Dept. report (PDF), Georgia doesn’t rank in the top 15 recipients of US aid in 1994 or 2004 (see page 17). Even if you took the usual suspects in 2004 off the list (Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Afghanistan), Georgia is somewhere below places like Bolivia, Turkey, Liberia, and Kenya.

    It appears, then, that American financial assistance to Georgia, while not negligible, is not really all that exceptional, especially militarily.

    The question is: Why is the US sooooo interested in Georgia? Why is Georgia becoming a proxy for the US in the Caucusus?

    I can think of a lot of reasons, not the least of which is proximity to several centers of jihadism. Certainly having an ally more reliable than Turkey in the Caucasus region, especially an at least nominally democratic one like Georgia, makes strategic sense in the context of the War on Terror and certainly fits into the Bush Administration’s democracy-promotion agenda.

    No doubt Georgia, like Iraq, was envisioned as a place from which democracy could conceivably spread to neighboring states.

    That’d be my guess, anyways.

    Calling Georgia a “proxy”, though, seems like… a bit of a stretch, to say the least.

  13. Chris Holman says:

    Heck, Shevardnadze received 100 million in one year from the US. Georgia received 778 Million in US Aid from 1992-2000 alone!

    I feel like I’m hammering on this, but the US gave substantial aid in various forms to Georgia. We have a permanent presence (recently privatized in part) of military trainers (read: SpecOps Operators) and our support for Saakashvili is pretty unparalleled when it comes to FSU states. I can’t find any other place where the US is so entrenched in the goings on of an FSU state.

    No doubt the long-standing issue is of great import, but I don’t think that this point I am making is minor in all of this. I think it’s, in part, responsible for the way things unfolded. Sending in the cavalry is one thing, but take a serious look at what the US has done for Georgia in the last 15 years, especially after the Rose Revolution. Hell, the fact that we’re arguing for Georgia to be fast-tracked into NATO is in and of itself a fast-track to a treaty-bound obligation to rush to Georgia’s defense.

    The question is: Why is the US sooooo interested in Georgia? Why is Georgia becoming a proxy for the US in the Caucusus? Furthermore, why push things so and then sit back and say you’re sorry when so much is at stake for the people there?

    It’s just negligent behavior.

    This comment ended up getting caught by the spam filter somehow. Sorry it took so long to notice.

  14. Vincent says:

    I think you’re really overstating the amount that the United States got involved in Georgian military affairs, too. We’ve sold them some helicopters, some rifles, and engaged in some counter-terrorism training. As near as I can tell, judging by this and this, we’ve spent about $120 million on Georgia, which seems fairly insubstantial, as far as these things go.

    our relationship with Georgia is pretty unique when it comes to FSU states

    What about the Baltic States, which are already part of NATO? The government of Ukraine, too, seems fairly interested in getting into NATO as well, though the public, by all accounts, is less enthusiastic.

    It was the nature of the US-Georgia relationship that was problematic

  15. Chris Holman says:

    Precisely. The US was, stupidly, picking on Russia by meddling in Georgia so heavily. Again, not blaming the US 100% here, but our relationship with Georgia is pretty unique when it comes to FSU states. It was the nature of the US-Georgia relationship that was problematic…

    Saakashvili didn’t walk up and hit the champ, but he did egg him on. It was far from prudent to march into S. Ossetia with guns ablaze and expect a newly-eager Russia to sit on its well-prepared haunches. Saak wouldn’t have been as aggressive if he thought he had help. As soon as he realized he had no help, most articles on the conflict spoke of Georgian military forces “running out of the city” and “heading to Tbilisi” to protect the capital. OOPS!

    The status quo that had been developed in Abkhazia and S. Ossetia was precisely that Georgia was messing with Russia(ns). Honestly, the S. Ossetia case is less cut and dry with me, whereas the situation in Abkhazia is. The latter fought for their territory and won as lines were being redrawn. Their claim is more legitimate than Russia’s claim to S. Ossetia.

    Definitely an interesting geography at play, and a very interesting discussion.

    As for the article you posted, it is capped at the beginning and end with good arguments, but the diatribe against liberals (et. al.) in the middle was pretty vitriolic and off target…I think anyway. More personal loathing than good analysis.

  16. Vincent says:

    But Georgia didn’t go picking on Russia — it invaded a breakaway territory whose borders were drawn on map by Stalin and which has never been historically independent.

    Russia may well have interests there, but South Ossetia is not an internationally recognized state — it is part of Georgia and the Georgian government was reasserting control there when the Russians invaded.

    Saakashvili might not have acted prudently, but it’s absurd to imply that he walked up to the heavyweight champion and punched him in the face, to use your metaphor.

  17. Chris Holman says:

    I’m saying that had the US not had as much gusto in ‘supporting’ and militarizing and training and backing the Georgians…Georgia would likely have been less likely to drive into Ossetia…and we’d be less likely to be in this situation.

    I’m saying that Georgia believed that ‘we’ had their back. So they were ballsy.

    The US can poke its nose where it wants, but I’m saying that the poking should be a bit more refined and done more intelligently than what was done in Georgia. If anything, the way the US went about establishing its facade of support for Georgia is part of the problem that we have on our hands now. We’re not wholly to blame, but to ignore the role of Georgia’s belief that we had their back…is ridiculous.

    The small guy in the group doesn’t go and pick on the World Champion Heavyweight Boxer unless he thinks he has friends to help back him up OR he’s insane with a death wish.

  18. Timothy says:

    You know, old Vlad is 144 years behind Sherman on this.

  19. Vincent says:

    I

  20. Chris Holman says:

    Well, let’s not lie to each other…FSU states are ‘independent’ but still heavily aligned with Moscow. Look at former-colonial states…where are there allegiances? I’m just saying that while Georgia is indeed an independent state, it wasn’t acting like Georgia normally would if it didn’t think it had the backing of a major power (US) and perhaps a major alliance (NATO).

    I do see what you’re getting at, but I also don’t think that the nation-state system is set up to be ‘fair’ in the sense that everyone is equal…even if it comes down to sovereignty. Granted, Russia stopped short of Tbilisi because they want to show the system SOME respect while still accomplishing some goals and shoving some bombs down Saakshvili’s throat. I imagine it will be harder for Saak to speak the way he has been in the last few years after this.

    I’ll go read Hanson.

  21. Vincent says:

    In my opinion, far more trenchant analysis than Kagan’s can be found in this Victor Davis Hanson article.

  22. Vincent says:

    I dunno. Last I heard, Georgia was an independent state responsible for its own foreign policy. Or are minor powers in the “sphere of influence” of greater powers not allowed to do that anymore?

    Someone notifiy Hugo Chavez. And I’m not sure I’m comfortable with Canada being part of that whole “Commonwealth of Nations” thing, come to think of it.

    Okay, so I know I’m being a bit snarky, but do you see what I’m getting at?

  23. Chris Holman says:

    Oh…so a veto over the vote for possible NATO members. Ok.

    Still, I would think that most nations in NATO would want their spheres of influence to be similarly respected, no? Is this really a Russian veto or is it more of the status quo but with Russia at the center of it all?

  24. Vincent says:

    What is NATO these days?

    Impotent and irrelevant.

    Still not sure how this fiasco means that Russia has a veto over NATO.

    The major reason that Georgia was not allowed into NATO was “Russian security concerns”. Russia’s de facto veto isn’t a result of this crisis, it’s something that emerged awhile ago.

    In fact, Kosovo may have been what really got Putin going in the first place

    Yeah. Putin is on record as saying that if Kosovo became independent, it set a certain precedent for other breakaway regions.

  25. Chris Holman says:

    Vincent, all of the talk about NATO (here and everywhere else) has made me wonder:

    What is NATO these days? The Soviet Menace is gone.

    So what’s the point? Does NATO even make sense as an acronym any more? Point being, there’s obviously an end to the Cold War and the need for what created NATO in the first place…so where is NATO heading?

    I’m genuinely curious as to what people think.

    “*yawn* Surely Kaplan can do better than shouting the old

  26. Chris Holman says:

    To be perfectly honest, I think that it makes the most sense to engage Russia diplomatically and strategically because we stand to gain from such a relationship and the Russians would actually love to have the US as a strong partner. Of course, militarizing Georgia was a stupid move on behalf of the US. Supporting a guy who started out rosy and is ending up looking the fool was ok in the beginning but stupid once the old Saak started behaving like an uber-nationalist crusader (crushing opposition last year).

    Russia has made the right move here, and I hope that if the Saak stays in power in Georgia, that his thoughts on where he stands in the world have adjusted to fit the recent learning curve.

    The US needs to back off Georgia and work with Russia, not against. Post-Soviet Russia has some good things going on despite the iron fist of Putin, and there are still democratic forces operating there. If the US and Europe insist on playing hard ball, they both lose a strong partner in the region(s) and they hasten the erosion of what was started with the fall of the USSR.

    I’m glad, on a humanitarian level, that the situation has come to an end (at least for the moment). I can’t imagine what it’s like to be an Ossetian running north to Russia and getting caught in the crossfire.

  27. Vincent says:

    I

  28. Niedermeyer says:

    I’d agree that the parallels to the Iraq war are a stretch, despite the fact that a “low-level shooting war” is a fairly accurate description of Georgian-Russian relations over the past decade or so. The significance of Iraq here is exactly as Chris points out: it’s handcuffing our ability to check Russian aggression.

    On the other hand, this may not be a horrible thing. I think many conservatives downplay the moral ambiguity of the situation, preferring to paint Georgia as the heroic democracy standing up to Russian Tsarism. Russia’s presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia do give it legitimate security interests there (not to mention Georgia’s role in the Chechnya/Dagestan situations) which were threatened by Georgia’s precipitous action. More importantly, Georgia has abandoned the moral high ground by launching unguided (and inaccurate) rockets into the South Ossetian capital, killing and displacing civilians. This doesn’t necessarily justify Russia’s incursion into Georgia proper, but it does eliminate the moral clarity that ideologues want to impose on the situation.

    In any case, it seems that the worst of this conflict is now behind us. But its legacy will cast a huge shadow over FoPo debates however, the main question being to what extent is a focus on Russian containment worthwhile? My feeling is not so much, although in this country ideology typically trumps practicality. Casting Georgia as the innocent victim here furthers the unhelpful ideological elements of foreign policy, and further commits the US to the role of a militaristic evangelist of democracy. I’d argue that embracing that role to an extreme is what has landed us in our current, impotent situation.

    We’ve been in a post-unipolar moment for some time, and now a sphere-of-influence multipolarity is replacing it. Unlike philosophy (etc), geo-politics doesn’t support “post-whatever” paradigms. Things need to be understood as they are, and this war helps clarify the new order. It’s not pretty, but the world isn’t going to go back to 1945 no matter how much we want it to.

  29. Chris Holman says:

    There’s plenty to criticize with Russia’s movement into Georgia, but the problem is that George Bush cannot easily stand up and have any credibility when he says, ‘Hey y’all, you can’t just invade a country for no good reason!’ Putin would laugh all the way to the Bank of Tbilisi.

    For what it’s worth, I don’t think that Russia is going for all of Georgia. I think they want Abkhazia and Ossetia back, and neither of those two parties will mind; although, Abkhazia will likely push for autonomous status within the federation like Tartarstan.

    As for what NATO is fearing, I imagine that people don’t want their natural gas to turn off. I’m not sure that this is the same thing as not wanting a military confrontation with Russia though, which Kaplan was right to say would be where we are if Georgia was a NATO member. Of course, Georgia is not, but I don’t think it can easily be chalked up to gas. It plays a large role though I imagine.

    The Ukraine has already been hit by Putin (Yuschenko poisoning anyone?) and Russia is pissed off about the NATO thing but also because the US wants to put a missile defense system in the Ukraine. Are enough NATO members going to be willing to jump in and stand behind D.C. in its pissing contest with Russia? Maybe.

    The situation in Ukraine is far different from what we have in Georgia too. People keep making assumptions that Georgia is falling because it is tiny or “backwater”. There’s obviously more to it, starting with the Abkhaz and Ossetians and ending in the US-Georgian make-out sessions.

    Georgia hasn’t held any Abkhaz territory for over a decade, beyond a sliver that is. Their political hold on S. Ossetia has been equally troublesome. Putin doesn’t have to send in support for terrorists there (whoever they might be) because the fact of the matter is, the people have stood up to Georgia in one way or another on their own and won…when it counted too (at least in Abkhazia).

    I agree that Russian strategy isn’t set in stone, but the US is currently fighting two wars. The US military is in a shambles and Putin knows this. He might be crazy enough to think that he could do some damage conventionally in his own back yard with a legitimate casus belli. At least, his cause for being in Georgia is as strong as Colin Powell’s UN presentation was…the US couldn’t escalate the war much further because it just cannot and then we’re back to wondering how much fun NATO members think it would be to hop in and support the US defense of a Georgian offensive move that the Russians defended with a hellish offensive onslaught.

    Kaplan’s point about the draft and WWIII is that too many people these days shout from the rooftops about how the US is in the ‘fight of the generation’ and all sorts of other crap. Kaplan is calling their bluff. If the Russia-Georgia thing is what some people are yelling about, or even if Iraq as a side note is a generational war on terror (yadda yadda) stop whinging about it and go sign up. Stop warmongering from the safety of your computer screen and help the draft get reinstated. It may look like a straw man, but seriously…someone needs to say something to the schmucks out there who won’t stop fantasizing about what the US is in the middle of…or should be in the middle of in Georgia.

  30. Kaplan says:

    “Far from making sense, Kaplan is essentially writing fantasy.”

    Insolent welp! how dare you insult a knight of the realm! Renege on your cowardly words or prepare to defend yourself against my +1 broadsword of opinion!

  31. Vincent says:

    Gotta say, I think the Kaplan piece engages in a lot of fantasizing along the “Europeans are so much more nuanced” lines:

    The Europeans rejected the idea, understanding the geo-strategic implications of pushing NATO’s boundaries right up to Russia’s border.

    Yeah, maybe. Or they were afraid the gas would get turned off.

    If the Europeans had let Bush have his way, we would now be obligated by treaty to send troops in Georgia’s defense. That is to say, we would now be in a shooting war with the Russians.

    Or perhaps Russia would’ve thought twice about invading a country that the West was firmly committed to. Some have pointed to Ukraine as Putin’s next likely target. I suppose it’s possible, but since Ukraine borders on Poland, an EU member, it’d be a far more risky move than invading some Caucasian backwater like Georgia which only George Bush thought might be worth sticking up for.

    Kaplan seems to forget the lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Russians might like to play rough, but a shooting war with the United States is probably fairly low on the list of desirable outcomes. More likely than his fantasy war between Russia and the U.S. is a situation where Russia eschews a full-scale invasion because of the possibility of a wider conflict in favor of ratcheting up barely-disguised support for terrorist elements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia accompanied by a diplomatic push to resolve the Pankisi Gorge question as well as negotiations toward Ossetian and Abkhazian independence/autonomy, with said support for violent elements in said regions acting as their bargaining chips.

    In short, it’s not as if Russia is spoiling to take on the United States any more than we are them. Kaplan’s article seems to treat Russian strategy as basically set in stone, which it is, of course, not.

    After that, he goes off the deep end, posing absurd hypotheticals to straw-man neocons about universal conscription and World War III. Kaplan’s piece basically reads like a primer in the “anticipatory capitulation” that Bindinotto was describing:

    “It’s a good thing we didn’t support our allies, because that might have possibly led to some nasty consequences. What are we supposed to do, really?”

    His last three paragraphs make a lot more sense than the blather that preceded them, though. It’s clear that Russia desires to be treated in the same way it was treated when the Soviet Union existed — that is, as a serious and dangerous player on the international scene. Fine. Let’s start treating them that way. I’m not sure that rolling over and just letting them have Georgia really sets the right precedent, though. At this point, it’s probably a fait accompli, but where do we go from here?

    The West’s prestige, or what’s left of it, can’t afford too many more Georgias. If we’re ready to lay down our arms at the merest hint that blood might be shed, then I can’t see too many states trusting us to follow through on any sort of alliance obligations.

    I really don’t see how conceding the world stage to China, Russia, Islamic terrorists, and any other actor that threatens unpleasant consequences in return for showing some backbone really serves anyone’s interest.

    Far from making sense, Kaplan is essentially writing fantasy.

  32. OCReader says:

    Vincent, you hit this right on the head. Good writing. Good logic. No one seems to criticize Russia – a nuclear power – when they invade a small country (justified or not), yet the world would be quick condemn some other countries.

  33. Chris Holman says:

    Kaplan makes sense

    http://www.slate.com/id/2197281

  34. Chris Holman says:

    Well, let’s just say that democracy hasn’t worked out for Russians en masse. You have old-timers agitating for the good ol’ days of the USSR, but you have a younger wave of neo-fascist nationalists who love a guy like Putin who has been the only Russian leader in the last 30 years to successfully pin the nutsack on the bear.

    Putin can’t re-establish the USSR. Looting FSU’s is also a moot point because when it comes to FSU’s all roads lead to Moscow. New leaders in those states have had few choices when it comes to who gets the goods.

    Russians have had a raw deal to be sure, but they’re a force to be reckoned with.

  35. Timothy says:

    Confirms my suspicion that Putin is basically trying to reestablish the USSR because he didn’t get to loot enough things when it fell. I feel awful for the people of Russia, Tsarism stomped on them for centuries and just when things were looking up, BOOM, Lenin.

  36. Chris Holman says:

    I keep making stupid spelling mistakes, sorry.

  37. Chris Holman says:

    I agree that their public statements are bullshit, but it’s KGB and friends in charge, hehe. Russia is using them as a casus belli, but Russia also played a major role in the ceasefire between Abkhazia and Georgia (in 1994). In that sense, yes Russia wants influence in the FSU’s but that also makes sense because it’s there sphere of influence. What would Russia be if they couldn’t be a facilitator in the FSU’s? Even the UN admits that it has less influence there and that Russia is the best guarantor of stability…ironic saying that at the moment, but still…..

    For what it’s worth, Russia maintained military bases in Georgia for some time after the fall and even this was agreed upon when Georgia was looking for help to counter centripetal forces. So, it does make sense that Russia has had their forces in Georgia or on the border. At least one base as been in Abkhazia and has been home to Russian peacekeepers.

    It’s worth noting that Abkhazia enjoyed autonomy until Stalin incorporated it into Georgia.

    Tblisi also pissed off Russia when they, allegedly, let Chechens take refuge in the Pankisi Gorge in 2001.

    Abkhazia might be compelled to be absorbed by Russia if need be as well since there is precedent for autonomous states within the greater Mother Russia (see: Tartarstan). Thus, they are absorbed, but they are left alone by big bear.

    The history between the Persian-peoples of North and South Ossetia, Russia and Georgia is a very long one. The ethnic and military conflicts have been very bloody and ruthless, but make for great reading. hehe

    If you ask me, Russia is teaching the Georgians a lesson for provoking in the first place. The Georgians, as you’ve noted, mistook their power base in America and fans within NATO as something that would back them up. So, now they’re in a real bad spot and Russia is taking advantage of Tblisi’s over-reaching in S. Ossetia. In other words, Putin will say that the Georgians started it and he is going to finish it, ruthlessly.

    I would say that this is closer to the US invasion of Iraq in that the Russians (read: United States) welcomed the Georgian’s (read: Al-Qaeda types) provocation in South Ossetia (read: NYC) and are now in the midst of a larger campaign that has been on the back burners for some time but is now being put into play precisely because of the casus belli and overwhelming political/military force…even if that means lying through your teeth about it. Could it have been handled differently? Sure! Were there opportunities for a relatively peaceful solution? Of course. But why not give the world the finger and extend your power base somewhat? What is the world going to do? Go to war with you? Nah. They’ll clam shut and hope for the best while reluctant inter-state relationships stay in their status quo. Plus, this is far easier than carpet bombing Chechnya. You’ve got allies in country and those small regions fielded militaries that beat the Georgians and more or less forced them out of their territory via ambiguous peace treaties (read: No Fly Zone for Kurds).

  38. Vincent says:

    And, as I said, Abkhazia and South Ossetia should probably be allowed to go their own way.

    That being said, however, Russia is not intervening to protect the rights of the Abkhazians or Ossetians. South Ossetia and Abkhazia merely serve as a convenient causus belli for Russia to use as an excuse to deal with Georgia itself.

    It’s hard to believe that Russia just happened to have a well-organized combined arms force ready on the border. This has been in the works for awhile.

    Also, if Russia were simply interested in “peacekeeping”, they wouldn’t be bombing oil pipelines. It’s utter nonsense.

  39. Vincent says:

    Russia

  40. CJ Ciaramella says:

    I move to change the headline to include an urbane pop culture reference. Perhaps “Georgia on my mind” or “Midnight Tank Convoy to Georgia.” Wait, even better: “The night the lights went out in Georgia.” Oh, snap!

    /Sorry. I’m completely ignorant on this subject and have nothing better to say.

  41. Chris Holman says:

    This situation has been stewing since the fall of the USSR.

    It’s good you bring oil into the picture because one of the reasons that the US has backed Georgia so heavily (besides the fact that its leadership is US-educated/allied) is because of the oil pipeline (Baku-Ceyhan). So, the US sense in SpecOps to train Georgian military and sets up a permanent US training force in Georgia. South Ossetia is indian country with high levels of irredentism given where North Ossetia is. Then, you have Abkhazia who actually WON in a war against the Georgians and yet, was not allowed to enjoy the typical fruits of such things (i.e. self-rule). So, the US backs Georgia who wants to consolidate despite losing to the Abkhaz and who wants Ossetia as their own despite the fact that they cannot police the area well, if at all. Georgia proper is stuck in the middle of another Cold War scenario in a sense; although, it’s not as insane as what we saw in the CW.

    Russia supports both the Abkhaz and Ossetians because of the blatant US support for the Georgians. Russia is also pissed off because the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline stands to take a lot of ‘Russian’ gas and oil out of the Caucusus and ship it to the West, rather than North to Moscow (as usual).

    My point here is that while Russia is indeed playing some serious stuff here, the US has stuck its nose into Russia’s backyard. I’m not saying we shouldn’t support Rose Revolutions that lead to democracy, etc. I’m saying that there is far more to this situation than what is on the surface.

    NATO’s limits have yet to be tested really, and I’m not sure why you’re berating them for Afghanistan given their healthy contributions there.

    Europe also has a variety of oil avenues, but I’ll give you Eastern Europe. Still, the North Atlantic, Baku-Ceyhan, and traditional methods (shipping) get Europe as much oil as, say, Japan gets. Russian oil is a big deal, but it’s hardly the only shop on the block.

    I also don’t think this is easily chalked up to Russia wanting to reclaim the FSU’s…and the de facto control is already there in many cases. That makes sense though because the relationships between FSU’s and Russia can’t simply go away overnight.

  42. Juma says:

    Russia’s role in Georgia is akin to NATO’s in 1999 when it bombed Yugoslavia – with heaps of civilian targets – to stop it from ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. I didn’ t see any head of state of any NATO member nation been dragged to The Hague for that, it was Milosevich instead. I expect Saakashvili to follow the same fate.

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