Preparing for a Future War
When reading this article at Foreign Policy, one gets the sense that the author is mostly correct in criticizing the military’s apparent mania for developing absurdly expensive “toys”, but I don’t think she takes it far enough. Her argument seems to be that many of the technologies that the military chooses to invest in (hypersonic aircraft, for instance) may, in the future, turn out to have been expensive endeavors with no real practical value, while more down-to-earth needs, such as defending against dirty bombs or researching alternative energy sources, fall by the wayside. Her point is probably correct — the history of military R&D (or pretty much any R&D, for that matter) is strewn with examples of failed experiments, research dead-ends, and money-sinks that, in the end, have no useful or tangible product.
The real problem is not that we’re investing in science fiction technology, it’s that we’re spending money on it to the exclusion of more mundane technology that, while less sexy, is nevertheless the backbone of any strong military.
Sometimes, apparently useless research avenues strike gold: during the First World War, for instance, Winston Churchill had the Royal Navy conduct independent development of “landships” (that is, tanks) because the Army thought the whole idea was “impractical”. In the end, the development of armor (along with a great deal of doctrinal innovation German tank commanders like Guderian) proved to be one of the biggest technological turning points in warfare in the 20th Century.
At the outset of the Second World War, Germany’s armor was generally not up to par with the weapons fielded by the French or the British (Germany’s best tank circa 1939 was, if I’m not mistaken, of Czech make), but their doctrinal superiority (Blitzkrieg tactics versus further development of the WWI method of using armor chiefly as infantry support) gave the Wehrmacht a distinct edge.
During the course of the the war, Allied forces modified their own tactics and adapted to the realities of modern warfare. By the same token, Germany quickly closed the technology gap, producing some of the finest tanks and aircraft of the war. In fact, by 1944-45, Germany had technologically surpassed the Allies in many areas. The famous American “Sherman” tank, for instance, was inferior in nearly every way to its German counterparts, and the Pershing, which could go toe-to-toe with anything the Wehrmacht could field, was only operational in February of 1945. The Sherman tank was successful in large part due to the sheer numbers of them available. While a Tiger or Panther model panzer might have been the superior weapon, there were relatively few of them, and they were eventually overwhelmed.
The same can be said for Germany’s “wonder weapons” like the Me-262, which was the world’s first operational fighter jet. While it was basically superior to anything the Allies were widely using, the sheer numbers of cheaper Allied strategic bombers and long-range escort fighters meant that the Me-262 was essentially too little, too late.
Which brings us to the F-22. In a sense, the F-22 is our Me-262. It is far superior to anything that anyone else in the world can field against us, and probably by an even greater margin than the 262 was in 1945.
The problem is that, as recently as 2006, the Air Force is proposing to purchase only 183 of them, and if past trends are anything to go by, that number is bound to decrease before all is said and done. Contrast that number with the 730 F-15’s used over the years by the USAF and the ANG, and keep in mind that the F-22 is meant to “replace” the aging F-15 (which have been around since the early 1970’s and which are now beginning to break up in the sky). That’s 4 F-15’s for every F-22.
So what happens in 2025 when the F-15 is finally taken out of service (along with the F-16, which is going to be decomissioned the same year and ostensibly replaced with the F-35, or Joint Strike Fighter)? What will the Air National Guard be flying? Because you can bet your boots that it won’t be F-22’s.
This is where I think Weinberger doesn’t take her argument far enough. Instead of working on developing tools to “cope with the present”, as she puts it, we should be looking toward the future, but with our eyes on developing cheaper, more common aircraft for more general uses. In a sense, this is what the F-35 is intended to do (the United States currently estimates that it will purchase nearly 1800 F-35’s).
The old adage is that the military is always fighting the last war. Weinberger seems to be arguing that there’s an element of pointlessness in preparing for future wars. On that, I disagree. Though expensive and seemingly overkill as projects like the F-22 or Aegis cruisers may be, it would be folly to let the world narrow the technological gap. Nevertheless, her point is well taken. Rather than focusing so exclusively upon such “toys”, it would seem prudent to start replacing our aging arsenal not with sexy super-fighters like the F-22, but rather with more utilitarian aircraft that can serve both the needs of the present as well as the future without breaking the bank.
