Losing Georgia
Russia’s invasion of Georgia on Friday has been illustrative in a number of ways:
First, it’s now clear that Putin’s Russia is undeniably set upon a course of regaining at least de facto control over its former satellites, some of which have been resisting Russian and Soviet expansion for centuries.
Second, NATO’s almost complete irrelevance has been laid bare. If the member states’ reluctance to contribute combat troops in Afghanistan weren’t enough, NATO’s dithering on admitting Georgia because of Russian security concerns means that Russia basically has unofficial veto power over NATO decisions.
Third, and related to the above point, Europe’s commitment to resisting Russian expansionism can probably no longer be counted on in any serious way, given that the economies of Europe are heavily dependent on Russian oil and natural gas exports. Standing up against Russian aggression, especially if Russia establishes control over Georgian pipelines, would be economically hazardous for the rest of Europe. It’s likely that the most we can expect is a few sternly-worded expressions of “concern” and efforts to “resolve” any conflicts involving Russia, which the Russians would be more-or-less free to ignore unless they were generally favorable to their interests.
Finally, the essentially anti-American and anti-Israeli character of the so-called “anti-imperialist” crowd has been confirmed. There have been few expressions of “solidarity” with Georgia and none of the lionization we’ve seen heaped upon “the resistance” in Iraq and elsewhere (remember “We are all Hizb’Allah now!“?).
It’s not as if all the usual ingredients are missing: oil, lack of international approval, a naked land grab and basically unprovoked invasion, civilian casualties, a “disproportionate response” — essentially all the complaints that were trotted out in 2003 (and 1991, frankly).
No, there will be no protests, no street theatre, no demands that heads of state be marched around the Hague. Much like what happened during the period Serbian adventurism in the 1990’s, we can probably expect a lot of dithering, a lot of excuses, and probably a few outright defenses of the aggressors from the “anti-imperialist” bunch.
Socialist Worker’s Party hack Richard Seymour (aka “Lenin”, known for his support of Serbian expansionism), for instance, has already blamed the United States for instigating and prolonging the conflict:
Georgia and its backers are being absolutely intransigent, refusing to withdraw Georgian troops from South Ossetia, where – not that you would know it from much of the reporting – they are actually carrying out serious atrocities.
Harry’s Place notes that “Socialist Unity” endorses this point of view as well:
So the signs are that current war has been manufactured in Washington, and executed by Georgia.
…
The responsibility for preventing the war escalating lies with Washington, who must use their influence to reign back the Georgian government, and stop destabilising the present status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both of whom wish the Russians to stay.
These goblins, of course, completely ignore the fact that Russia’s “peace overture” would simply have the effect of finalizing Russia’s conquest of South Ossetia by forcing the Georgians to lay down their weapons now that the Russians have taken control on the territory. The Russians, for their part, rejected a return to the status quo ante and demanded that the democratically elected President of Georgia be removed. Hardly the “peacekeepers” resisting Georgian/American aggression that the “anti-imperialist” crowd is making them out to be.
Even Andrew Sullivan, who, despite his visceral disgust with the Bush Administration, is nowhere near as slimy and disingenuous as bloggers such as Seymour, can’t help but draw some sort of moral equivalence between Russia’s invasion of Georgia and the US invasion of Iraq:
On what grounds, after all, does the Bush administration condemn Russia? Launching a war without UN permission? Er … it’s not that easy for the US to go all high-minded at this point. How strong is the NATO alliance in reacting to this kind of provocation? Immeasurably weakened by the past seven years. Why is Russia so much more powerful than it was? Putin’s political skills and oil – whose value has sky-rocketed since the US invasion of the Middle East.
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So can we quit the hyper-ventilating, please? This is another indicator of how the world is not uni-polar, and how badly this administration has managed American soft and hard power for the last seven years. A stronger, more belligerent Russia is part of the post-Bush picture. And there’s not much anyone can do about it now. [emphasis added]
It seems bizarre to me that Sullivan would compare Russia’s naked land grab in Georgia with the invasion of Iraq. Yes, there are superficial similarities (no U.N approval, etc.), but even the most stringent opponent of Bush and the Iraq war cannot help but admit to the months of debate in the Security Council, the numerous resolutions, or the fact that American aircraft had been in a low-intensity shooting war with Iraqi air defense forces for nigh on a decade in a country where the U.S. has no territorial ambitions. The same cannot be said of Russia with regard to Georgia, and Andrew Sullivan makes a fool of himself by drawing the comparison.
He also misses the mark when he insinuates that a resurgent Russia is necessarily the product of Bush’s foreign policy. Russia’s aforementioned oil resources and European military apathy, as demonstrated in Afghanistan, have, I think, much more to do with Russia’s boldness than do any of Bush’s numerous foreign policy blunders.
In the end, the West’s failure in Georgia is symptomatic of a larger disease, one that views any sort of military action as unwarranted, unjust, and unnecessary. Robert Bidinotto has labeled this mindset as “anticipatory capitulation“:
The greatest terror of postmodern Westerners is “confrontation”: to be compelled into situations in which they must actually face down a bully. And, of course, taking a moral stand may sometimes lead to such “confrontations.”
So, in anticipation of any course of action that could possibly lead to a “confrontation,” postmoderns never take a moral stand. They look into the future, at where such a stand might lead them — and, terrified by the prospect, they back down pre-emptively. Often, they seek some sort of “compromise” with thugs that takes the “confrontation” option off the table. “Compromise” here means: anticipatory capitulation.
This is the policy that Border’s Books, Comedy Central, and the entire MSM adopted when contemplating even a hypothetical “confrontation” with Islamists who might become angry about their circulation of those Muhammad cartoons: They capitulated and refused to publish the cartoons, in mere anticipation of a possible showdown. [I’d add the recent Random House controversy…]
This is the policy that has, in fact, lay beneath much of Western foreign policy — as in endless, toothless UN resolutions (when they can even agree on one), and in our State Department’s anemic practice of tepidly voicing “concern” about this or that international bully’s actions, while evading any “provocative” language of condemnation that might “escalate” to a direct confrontation.
This all leads us to the question of whether our allies (Taiwan, anyone?) will, in the future, trust us to stand by them or simply expect us to issue a few strongly-worded statements and otherwise stand by while authoritarian states prey on their weaker neighbors.
Based on what’s happened so far in Georgia, I think the answer is fairly clear.
[EDIT]
Meanwhile, Michael Totten, who’s on his way to Azerbaijan, links to this May dispatch from Georgia. From the sound of things, South Ossetians really want to be part of Russia — or at least independent from Georgia. I’m not sure I’m entirely comfortable with Georgia militarily trying to prevent that — shades of Serbia, and all — but I’m pretty sure that Russia getting involved military isn’t the right way for that particular question to be resolved. It’s almost certainly not the best way to deal with the South Ossetia question, and it’s all a little too convenient for Russia. Some have gone so far as to call South Ossetia Russia’s “Sudetenland” or a latter-day Finland. I’m not sure if I think that’s totally apt, but there are shades of all that in what we’re seeing today.
